The Great Powers’ Struggle in Africa: China and Russia are sidelining the West, which is attempting to formulate a new strategy for the continent

By Dr. Asher (Asi) Lubotsky, Research Fellow, Israel Africa Relations Institute

 June 5, 2024

In recent years, Western countries, with an emphasis on the United States and France, have faced setbacks in Africa due to the assertiveness of China and Russia on the continent. Chinese and Russian involvement complement each other and pose a dual threat to Western dominance: China, over the past two decades, has solidified its position as a significant external economic player on the continent (including effective control over many critical resources), while Russia, especially since the establishment of Wagner Group and even more so since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has established substantial security footholds in various parts of Africa. 

The latest developments: 

  • Sahel region: military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have brought leaders closer to Russia. The fall of the pro-Western government in Niger was particularly significant for the West, as this country was one of the focal points of American presence in the Sahel region and a key base for the fight against escalating terrorism on the continent. Niger’s global importance also stems from its uranium deposits (and ongoing uranium sales negotiations with Iran). As part of this shift, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso replaced American and French forces deployed in their territories as part of the war on terror with Russian forces. The desire to expel Western forces extended beyond these three countries to states that were previously considered pro-Western: Chad expelled American forces stationed there, and Senegal’s new prime minister, with close ties to France, signaled a possible closure of the French base in the country. Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso also formed a defense alliance called the ‘Alliance of the Sahel States,’ challenging ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel alliance, which are closer to the West, and are working to replace their currency (the West African CFA franc tied to France) with a Sahelian independent currency.
  • Horn of Africa: Ethiopia-U.S. relations have been strained due to American criticism of the management of the Tigray War (2020-2022), during which approximately 600,000 people lost their lives. In response, Ethiopia has taken steps to strengthen its ties with Russia (already having strong relations with China) and recently joined the expanding BRICS bloc, signaling its intentions to Washington. In Sudan, amidst the ongoing civil war, Russia is making moves to establish a naval foothold in the Red Sea; there are indications of an agreement with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which controls Port Sudan and is also drawing closer to Iran.
  • Central Africa: the Wagner Group has effectively established itself as the de facto army of the Central African Republic, and educational institutions in the country have even begun requiring Russian language studies. The nation, which is adjacent to some Sahel countries and faces its own jihadist activity, serves as a primary base for Russian operations on the continent.
  • South Africa: one of the central countries on the continent, there has been a notable shift in recent years toward a global policy that conceals American interests, particularly in aligning with Russia following its invasion of Ukraine and promoting anti-Israel policies in international forums and relations with Hamas.
  • Libya: Russia aims to strengthen its presence in the eastern part of the country, likely with the goal of establishing a naval foothold in the Mediterranean Sea.

African nations that are shifting toward Russia and distancing themselves from the West share common threads: Beyond historical grievances related to Western exploitation of the continent, these countries express disappointment with the West’s inadequate military assistance in addressing their security challenges. Additionally, they perceive aid conditions—often tied to internal affairs like human rights—as restrictive.

This holds true for Ethiopia, where the U.S. refrained from supporting its fight against Tigrayan rebels, but even more so for the Sahel countries and Central Africa. In this region, jihadist activity has dramatically increased (largely associated with al-Qaeda or Daesh) since the weakening of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and Western intervention—including boots on the ground—has not yielded significant results. 

African criticism of perceived neglect, insufficient investment, and limitations on action by the United States was underscored by recent remarks from Niger’s Prime Minister, Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine. He explained the motivation behind revoking the military agreement that allowed U.S. troops to deploy in Niger. Zene accused the U.S. of abandoning the country after Washington ceased military operations against jihadist terror while maintaining its presence at bases in Niger following the military coup. “The Americans stayed on our soil, doing nothing while the terrorists killed people and burned towns… It is not a sign of friendship to come on our soil but let the terrorists attack us. We have seen what the United States will do to defend its allies, because we have seen Ukraine and Israel”, Zene asserted.

In contrast, the Russian Wagner Group, recently rebranded by Russia as the ‘Africa Corps,’ is considered more effective in combating terrorism on the continent. Their focus lies in safeguarding local government stability and survival (including personal protection of leaders), which resonates particularly with certain African leaders. Unlike American military involvement, Russian forces prioritize these aspects. Beyond international prestige and formulating new alliances, Russia’s expanding influence in Africa provides access to valuable natural resources, strategic ports, and new markets for arms and energy exports. 

It appears that the decline of Western influence in Africa has gradually gained ground, and both the United States and France struggle to formulate an effective response. The U.S.‘s military presence in Africa, which expanded during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, diminished during the Trump administration. However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration has taken steps to restore American influence on the continent. In May 2022, Biden approved the redeployment of American forces in Somalia; in August 2022, his administration unveiled a new strategy for Africa, emphasizing the need to counter Russian and Chinese encroachment; and in December 2022, an African-American leaders’ summit was convened in Washington. Nevertheless, it seems that only recently has Washington increased its strategic response to the deteriorating situation of its influence on the continent.

In May 2024, it was reported that the United States is interested in Kenya becoming the first country south of the Sahara to be recognized as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” (a status also enjoyed by Israel and Egypt, for example). Kenya is poised to receive significant investments, and it appears that the U.S. is already establishing a permanent military base there. Kenya has a long history of partnership with the U.S., including in counterterrorism efforts and peacekeeping. As a relatively democratic government with proximity to the Red Sea, Kenya holds strategic importance, especially in the current context. The ongoing civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia further elevate Kenya’s significance as a center of stability and regional strength.

Simultaneously, the U.S. is increasing its support for several West African countries that remain close to Washington, such as Benin, Cape Verde (where the U.S. is adjusting its troop deployment following their withdrawal from Niger), and Ghana.

The weakening of the U.S. and France in various parts of Africa, coupled with Russia’s growing influence—particularly in the Sahel region and Central Africa—represents a dramatic shift in power dynamics among nations on the continent. This development, combined with China’s strengthening economic presence in Africa, poses an additional challenge to American dominance in shaping the international order. Russia’s rising profile in Africa is particularly relevant given the increasing African demand for security assistance against the growing global jihadist threat, and the disappointment with Western effectiveness in this context.  

From Israel’s perspective, the fact that many African countries are turning to Russia due to security challenges posed by the expanding global jihadist presence on the continent presents an opportunity for Israel to demonstrate its value. Israel itself is capable of providing security assistance in this area, further enhancing its position in Africa.